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 i 
Does Quantitative Easing have an impact on European equity 
markets? 





We examine whether the European Quantitative Easing program has an impact on equity 
markets, considering eight benchmark equity indices and applying a multivariate regression 
model. During the announcement period of the program, we find evidence of positive 
abnormal returns in 5 out of 8 benchmark indices, consistent with the portfolio rebalancing 
mechanism. When considering the launch period, we find positive abnormal returns in the 
German index (DAX30) and negative variations for both Spanish (IBEX35) and French 
(CAC40) indices. Furthermore, we suggest that the benchmark indices seem to react 
differently, depending on the country exposures to the program, for both announcement and 





Examinamos se o programa europeu de Quantitative Easing tem impacto nos mercados de 
ações, considerando oito índices de referência e aplicando um modelo de regressão 
multivariada. Durante o período de anúncio do programa, encontramos evidências de retornos 
anormais positivos em 5 de 8 índices de referência, resultado consistente com o mecanismo 
de reequilíbrio de portfolio. Quando considerando o período de lançamento, encontramos 
retornos anormais positivos no índice alemão (DAX30) e variações negativas para os índices 
espanhol (IBEX35) e francês (CAC40). Além disso, sugerimos que os índices de ações de 
referência parecem reagir de forma diferente, dependendo da exposição do país ao programa, 
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Monetary policy is characterized by the control of money supply in the economy, where price 
stability is reached through changes in key interest rates. According to Keynes (1936), interest 
rates are the equilibrating factor between liquidity and its demand, which is directly affected 
by investors’ liquidity preference. Moreover, adjustments in interest rates occur as a result of 
changes in inflation target levels (Taylor, 1999).  
At the end of the 80s, conventional monetary policy is empirically analyzed and studies from 
Clarida et al. (1999) point out that the policy is effective in influencing the short-term path of 
the real economy. Over expansionary times, central banks have a conventional intervening 
role in managing the liquidity conditions in the market and price stability by controlling the 
interest rates’ levels and regulating the target inflation. The most common use of such role is 
to lower interest rates to levels close to the zero lower bound, creating an environment of 
increasing levels of both individuals’ consumption and firms’ investment.  
However, when an economy is already under zero interest rates, one might question whether 
the policy is producing effective results for the economy. Hereupon, unconventional monetary 
policies emerge under the zero lower bound (ZLB) environments as a solution to re-establish 
economic relations (including financial intermediation) and to push the economy towards 
sustainable growth. Usually, this policy follows a mechanism of large expansion of banks’ 
reserves through asset purchases programs, inducing potential changes in long-term key 
interest rates rather than only in short-term official rates (Joyce et al., 2012).  
The most well-known case of unconventional monetary policy is Japan’s economy in the end 
of the 90s. Under a deflationary environment combined with the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB), 
the Japanese conventional monetary policy lacks in terms of its means to stimulate aggregate 
demand, where the expansion of liquidity levels does not increase the investors’ willingness 
to spend extra cash. This phenomenon is known as liquidity trap (Krugman, 1998). To settle 
this flaw, in March 2001 the Bank of Japan introduced its Quantitative Easing program where 
the high level of central cash reserves held by the banks would be more than sufficient to 
spread across the economy (Joyce et al., 2012), yet the huge Japanese national debt and 
persistent levels of zero inflation made it difficult.  
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According to Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013), although there is a decrease in the Japanese 
long-term interest rates and an increase in price levels, those effects are transitory and only 
supported the economy and inflation growth for a short-term period. Moreover, factors such 
as exchange rates and US stock prices also influenced Japanese stock prices (Kurihara, 2006). 
From the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007-2008, other central banks have been 
conducting similar unconventional monetary policies. In the United States, one of the largest 
responses by the Federal Reserve (FED) is the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). 
Intended to support the banking and the financial system as a whole, the program includes 
large purchases of non-performing assets from financial institutions. Empirical evidence 
suggest that the program has been helpful in mitigating the credit risk associated with the 
financial turmoil, however Black and Hazelwood (2012) indicate that, for large TARP 
recipients, the average risk-taking increased more than for non-TARP recipients. 
Furthermore, Harris et al. (2013) state that banks’ efficiency decreased for TARP banks since 
asset managers of TARP receipts may default in terms of achieving the desired asset 
management quality.  
Between the end of 2008 and October 2014, the Federal Reserve decided to extend its 
interventions and implements the Large-Scale Asset Purchase Program (LSAP) to enhance 
the economic activity and further stimulate job creation. According to Gagnon et al. (2010), 
the program is successful in stimulating the US economy mainly by lowering both the 10-year 
term premium and long-term private borrowing rates. However, the program has little 
marginal effect on inflation levels and GDP growth evidence is tiny (Chen et al., 2011).   
Following the collapse in the US markets, the Bank of England approached its monetary 
policy and adopted the same unconventional policy applied at that time. According to Joyce et 
al. (2012), both the United States and the Bank of England’s Quantitative Easing programs 
are projected to create shocks in the yields / prices rather than merely solve banking liquidity 
issues. In detail, the first round of the UK’s Quantitative Easing program (March 2009 to 
February 2010) is effective in reducing conventional gilt yields by 100 basis points (Joyce et 
al., 2011). Moreover, FTSE All-Share index and other international equity indices register a 
decrease in their respective prices around the announcement of the UK’s QE program, 
suggesting a slightly negative effect on equity markets. 
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Observing these complex changes in developed economies, it may be relevant to understand if 
the adopted monetary policies based on money supply are truly effective to reach its 
economic goal and which factors influence potential losses of effectiveness. This fact may 
bring the discussion whether there is demand for market liquidity by consumers and investors 
or, instead, they have decreased their levels of risk tolerance. The persistent world crisis that 
perpetuates and the zero lower bound (ZLB) environment, combined with weak projected 
long-term economic growth, made Krugman (2013) refresh Alvin Hansen’s idea where the 
world is presented as being under a secular stagnation, in which the pattern is characterized 
by insufficient investment demand and low consumption regarding new sources of capital. 
Likewise, Summers (2015) supports and claims that the risk of moving towards a secular 
stagnation is greater for the Eurozone and Japan’s economies rather than for the United 
States.  
In this study, we analyze the impact of the European Quantitative Easing on equity markets 
since there is a lack of literature in analyzing the effects of the program in this specific asset 
class. For implementation, the study is conducted for eight European benchmark equity 
indices where we apply a Multivariate Regression Model (MVRM), proposed by Binder 
(1985) and jointly estimate the regression coefficients under the context of the Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression Model (SURM), presented by Zellner (1962). The intuition behind this 
estimation lays on the possibility of having event clustering in the analysis, potentially 
inducing contemporaneous covariance between the equity indices’ residuals (Section 3.1.). 
We choose an event window of (-5,5) days to sufficiently cover the effects around the 
Quantitative Easing program announcement and launch.  
Our results show that in the days around the program announcement, the European equity 
markets seem to react positively although in some cases (Spain, Austria and Portugal) the 
announcement evidences negative abnormal reaction for the benchmark equity indices. The 
political instability and the uncertainty associated with changes in governments may be 
factors that better explain this effect. For the days around the launch, we obtain negative 
variations in most of the indices, except for Germany. Here, it may be plausible to claim that 
the existing correlation between German economic system and the purchases from the ECB is 
crucial to influence asset prices to go up. This positive change may be also consistent with the 
mechanism of portfolio rebalancing (Tobin, 1969), evidencing a positive perception from 
investors to allocate their wealth into riskier assets as it is the case of equity classes.  
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Additionally, when excluding the market portfolio as an explanatory variable, we identify a 
positive pattern of abnormal equity returns in reaction to the Quantitative Easing 
announcement, especially for the three countries with the highest value of cumulative 
monthly net purchases from ECB (Germany, France and Italy). Therefore, one might point the 
exposure of different equity markets to the program as an explanatory factor for these 
abnormal variations in returns. During the days of the program launch, it seems that the 
program causes positive abnormal changes in returns (except for Spain) yet it lacks statistical 
significance. 
This study is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an overview regarding the effectiveness 
of Quantitative Easing, proposed by ECB, and which mechanisms the program may induce. 
Section 3 describes the applied methodology for this study and Section 4 presents the chosen 
sample data. Section 5 outlines the main results obtained following the methodology; 
likewise, it presents some explanations for them. Section 6 presents a suggestion regarding 
further research on this topic. Lastly, Section 7 exposes a reflection and main conclusion 
remarks that include both results and arguments that support all research.  
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2 Quantitative Easing in the European Union 
After establishing the Economic and Monetary Union in the end of 90s, the European Central 
Bank (ECB) defined a monetary policy focused on maintaining price stability by setting the 
inflation rate close and up to 2 percent. For that purpose, it uses conventional policy 
instruments to achieve the main economic goal, by simply managing key interest rates.  
Nevertheless, in response to the financial crisis of 2007-2008, the ECB changed its monetary 
policy approach since it faced a downward environment trapped by large public and private 
debts. With interest rates below one percent, the European Union introduced its initial 
program of asset purchases in May 2010 where the central bank began its Securities Markets 
Program (SMP) to steady the economic transmission mechanism. Two years later, the 
program is substituted by the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT).  
In literature, Gambacorta et al. (2014) analyze the macroeconomic effects of asset purchases 
policies and, by using a panel vector autoregression (VAR) for eight advanced economies 
including the Euro area, find that an injection of liquidity on central banks’ balance sheets 
creates a transitory positive effect in the economic output and an increase in asset prices. 
However, the continuous decline in the Eurozone inflation rate combined with low interest 
rates leads us to consider that the programs fell short on expectations.  
Under the persistent goal of achieving price stability and generating extra stimulus in the 
economy under the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) environment, on January 22, 2015 the ECB 
announced the Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP), known as Quantitative Easing (QE), 
characterized by massive purchases of long-term assets. In detail, it incorporates Eurozone 
national government bonds and other assets from the private sector.  
From the program launch on March 9, 2015, there is already plenty of research discussing 
how effective the European Quantitative Easing program may be in supporting the economy 
in the long-term as well as in achieving the target inflation rate. For instance, Demertzis and 
Wolff (2016) point out that the effects of the European Quantitative Easing program are too 
premature to identify and it is hard to understand which are the most affected asset classes 
relative to the program’s magnitude. Nevertheless, Andrade et al. (2016) find a positive 
general progression in the European economy, with higher prices in all sectors, subsequently 
of the PSPP announcement. Likewise, Bernanke and Kuttner (2004) claim that a decrease in 
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target interest rates leads to an increase in stock price indices. Additionally, Claeys and 
Darvas (2015) discuss that stock prices should increase due to the portfolio rebalancing 
channel. One might suggest that, if the long-term interest rates move towards zero as a 
reaction of large purchases of long-term assets, investors may be influenced to rebalance their 
portfolios by allocating their wealth from bonds to riskier asset classes, as it is the case of the 
stock market.  
This mechanism is initially approached by Tobin (1969) and assumes that money may not be 
a perfect substitute for government bonds (assumption of imperfect substitutability). Indeed, 
whether this hypothesis applies, equities and corporate bonds seem to be the closest 
substitutes for the purchased assets (Joyce et al., 2011) because the portfolio shift from 
investors intends to increase rates of return and, therefore, improve portfolio’s performance. 
Considering that this adjustment occurs on risky assets demand, one might state that it causes 
an upward movement in prices as well as a risk-return trade-off for investors, since the 
increasing levels of risk enhances portfolio returns. Further, the portfolio rebalancing channel 
is pointed out by Joyce et al. (2011) and Demertzis and Wolff (2016) as the first response 
mechanism from investors in reaction to unconventional monetary policies of asset purchases. 
On the other hand, the current economic situation is unconventional and the economic 
relations may not hold. For instance, the mechanism of portfolio rebalancing may not be 
adequate to reflect investor’s decisions. A research from Assefa et al. (2016) shows the 
presence of negative effects of interest rates on stock market indices returns of developed 
countries (characterized by falling interest rates). Those effects may be a result from the lack 
of effectiveness from the unconventional monetary policy under the Zero Lower Bound 
environment (ZLB). Whether we consider the weak economic recoveries over time, one might 
suggest that investors would have less risk tolerance levels and distrust regarding the 
European financial system as well as related monetary policies (Delivorias, 2015). 
Furthermore, one might also identify the existing political and unstable economic 
environments in the Eurozone countries as explanatory factors for the negative reactions from 
equity markets to the Quantitative Easing program.  
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3 Methodology 
According to MacKinlay (1997), an event study can be defined as the methodology to 
evaluate whether there is an abnormal change in returns caused by an impact from a certain 
economic or political event on a set of financial variables. The methodology aims to verify 
whether the returns are statistically normal or abnormal, in comparison with their realized 
returns. Thus, this study tries to understand whether there is a short-term impact of the 
European Quantitative Easing program on financial markets, across a set of Eurozone 
countries by considering the benchmark equity index for each country.  
3.1. Event Study: Multivariate and Seemingly Unrelated Regression Models 
In this study, the event windows overlap across equity indices meaning that the calendar days 
of the event are common to all. This may be a constraint for the standard application of the 
event study methodology. When event clustering occurs, one might state the presence of 
correlation between the standard error estimates (Pynnönen, 2005), heteroscedasticity and 
contemporaneous covariance between country-based residuals (Henderson, 1990).  
To handle and overcome these statistical issues, we employ a Multivariate Regression Model 
(MVRM), proposed by Binder (1985), that incorporates dummy variables for the days into the 
event window, accounting for the existence of an certain event. Conceptually, M equations are 
jointly estimated under the context of a Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model (Zellner, 
1962), which takes into account residual terms’ correlations among equations. Similar 
approaches have been applied by a considerable number of authors as it is the case of Collins 
and Dent (1984), Thompson (1985) and, recently, by Kim, Nam and Wynne (2009).  
The multivariate regression is estimated by using a (-5,5) event window and it incorporates 
dummy variables 𝐷𝑖𝑡 for each day in the event window, including the event day. Here, the 
regression coefficients represent the abnormal returns of the financial variables. The 
multivariate regression model is structured as the following: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛾𝑖,𝑎𝐷𝑎,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                  (1)                                    
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the log return of the index i during the day t, 𝛼𝑖 is the intercept for index i, 𝛽𝑖 is 
the slope coefficient on the market portfolio and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the log return of the market portfolio. 
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Then, 𝛾𝑖,𝑎 is the slope coefficient on the dummy variable,  𝐷𝑎,𝑡, that represents either the 
Quantitative Easing announcement (PSPPa) or launch (PSPP1) if 𝐷𝑎,𝑡 = 1 in all days in the 
event window and zero otherwise. 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term (residual), representing the remaining 
factors that may affect the returns of each index i during the days t, apart from the studied 
unconventional monetary policy. 
All M multivariate equations are jointly estimated by using a two-step estimator of the 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model (SURM), where each regression estimator is first 
estimated by an OLS regression and then optimized to obtain a FGLS estimator. Approached 
by the theory, under the presence of heteroscedasticity, a FGLS estimator incorporated in a 
suitable model (as it is SURM, for instance) is more effective than the single OLS estimator.  
In application, we conduct the model in four different forms. First, we include an event 
dummy  𝐷𝑎,𝑡 in the multivariate regression (1). For each time-series equation we regress the 
dependent variable (index i) on both market portfolio 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 and on the dummy variable  𝐷𝑎,𝑡. 
The regression does not include two dummies (PSPPa and PSPP1) simultaneously. 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡 +  ?̅?𝑖,𝑎𝐷𝑎,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                        (2) 
Second, we consider a single dummy  𝐷𝑎,𝑡 = 1 in all days of the existing event windows, each 
time we consider an event related to the European Quantitative Easing. Applying the 
multivariate regression (2), it only shifts the interpretation of  𝛾𝑖,𝑎 in (1) from individual 
abnormal returns to average abnormal returns ?̅?𝑖,𝑎 of index i. While the first methodology is 
used to access the individual impact of each event (either PSPPa or PSPP1), the second 
approach shows its average impact in a certain index.  
Third, we incorporate time-varying dummies in the multivariate regression (1), as referred by 
Pynnönen (2005) and recently followed by Rivolta (2014). Here, for each day in the event 
window, we apply a dummy variable  𝐷𝑎,𝑡 equal to 1, allowing the analysis of existing 
variations of index returns in each day and pointing out which day represents the highest 
change, inducing the presence of abnormal returns. 
There are only 10 time-varying dummies as consequence of excluding the T-5 dummy, 




. The model is jointly estimated for both PSPPa and PSPP1 (announcement 
and launch, respectively). 
In the last application of the model, we exclude the market portfolio (EUROSTOXX) from 
the multivariate regression (1) to isolate the impact of the program on equity indices and to 
verify which abnormal variations occur in returns by considering a single explanatory 
variable: The Quantitative Easing dummy (either PSPPa - announcement or PSPP1 - launch). 
We also do the process for the average abnormal return approach, by using the average 
dummy variable ?̅?. For this last process, we only consider the full sample period. 
To verify the appropriateness of the model, which takes into consideration potential 
correlations among country residuals as well as non-constant variance, we present the 
Breusch-Pagan test of independence (3), a 𝜒2statistic with 
𝑀 (𝑀−1)
2
 degrees of freedom, for all 
processes where we apply the Seemingly Unrelated Regression model. The test (𝜆) is 
estimated as the following:  






                                                               (3) 
 
where 𝑟𝑚𝑛 represents the correlation between the errors of the M equations and T the number 
of sample observations. Here, the null hypothesis is the presence of homoscedasticity, i.e., 
constant variance. If the null hypothesis is rejected, we may state the statistical evidence of 
heteroscedasticity.  
                                                 
1
 Known in literature and mentioned by Rivolta (2014) as perfect collinearity.  
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4 Data 
Our sample comprises of daily log returns of eight European benchmark equity indices from 
Eurozone countries, where each index is used to represent a particular country involved in the 
European Quantitative Easing program.  
We include the following equity country indices: DAX30 index for Germany, CAC40 index 
for France, MIB is the FTSE MIB for Italy, AEX index for the Netherlands, IBEX35 index 
for Spain, ATX index for Austria, BEL20 index for Belgium and PSI20 index for Portugal. 
These countries are chosen based on the amount of cumulative monthly net purchases, as at 
31
st
 October 2016, available on ECB website
2
, following the criteria “greater or equal than 20 
trillion of euros” (See Table 9 in the Appendix). Additionally, in the multivariate regression, 
we include market portfolio as an explanatory variable. We consider EUROSTOXX index, 
which is a liquid subset of the STOXX EUROPE 600 index that represents large to small 
capitalization companies of eleven Eurozone countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. All data for the 
study is extracted from Thomson Reuters DataStream. 
We include full sample observations from January 2, 2012 to October 31, 2016 to cover both 
announcement (PSPPa) and launch of ECB Quantitative Easing (PSPP1): January 22, 2015 
and March 9, 2015, respectively. We do not include data before 2012 to exclude the periods 
of financial crisis, since it is an event with significant impact on the European economy and 
its financial markets. Also, we consider a subsample period with observations ranging from 
January 2, 2014 to December 31, 2015 to access comparing or distinct results that may occur 
during the 5-year sample period, due to the existence of other potential relevant financial or 
economic events. 
4.1. Descriptive statistics  
This subsection presents essential descriptive statistics for each European benchmark equity 
index, to evidence the key differences across Eurozone countries. In Table 1, the descriptive 
statistics are Mean and Standard Deviation. Moreover, in this subsection, Table 2 presents the 
correlation coefficients between the eight European benchmark equity markets.  
                                                 
2
 Available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html 
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Panel A of Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the full sample period from January 2, 
2012 to October 31, 2016. According to the panel, most of the chosen European benchmark 
equity indices register, on average, positive returns except the Portuguese market index 
(PSI20). Panel B presents the summary statistics for the subsample period from January 2, 
2014 to December 31, 2015. On average, some negative returns emerge for certain benchmark 
equity indices, as it is the case of IBEX35 and ATX, while the remaining European 
benchmark equity indices hold their positive mark. 
Table 1 – Summary Statistics. This table presents the summary statistics for the eight European benchmark 
equity indices plus the market portfolio. The benchmark equity indices are the following: DAX30 is the German 
index, CAC40 is the French index, MIB is the FTSE MIB for Italy, AEX is the Dutch index, IBEX35 is the 
Spanish index, ATX is the Austrian index, BEL20 is the Belgium index and PSI20 is the Portuguese index. 
EUROSTOXX is the proxy for market portfolio. Panel A presents the summary statistics for the full sample 
period from January 2, 2012 to October 31, 2016. Panel B presents the summary statistics for the subsample 
period from January 2, 2014 to December 31, 2015. Here, both mean and standard deviation (Std Deviation) are 
presented in percentage and annualized from daily log returns of each index (one average, each year includes 
250 daily observations). 
  Panel A: Full Sample Panel B: Subsample 
  Mean (%) Std Deviation (%) Mean (%) Std Deviation (%) 
Germany (DAX30) 11.89 19.25 4.99 20.33 
France (CAC40) 7.40 19.59 4.22 19.54 
Italy (MIB) 2.57 25.82 5.99 23.98 
Netherlands (AEX) 7.62 17.01 4.93 17.97 
Spain (IBEX35) 1.43 23.01 -1.62 20.14 
Austria (ATX) 5.55 19.42 -2.99 18.37 
Belgium (BEL20) 10.96 16.43 12.09 15.96 
Portugal (PSI20) -3.20 20.84 -9.96 22.57 
Eurozone (EUROSTOXX) 7.72 18.59 4.84 18.71 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients between the chosen eight European 
benchmark equity indices, for the full sample period from January 2, 2012 to October 31, 
2016. In this range of observations, all correlation coefficients are positive and greater or 
equal 0.70. According to Knif et al. (2007), high correlation coefficients may be explained by 
the presence of volatility in both internal and external markets. Moreover, the increasing level 
of market integration may also cause the increasing correlation among national stock markets. 
Further, Hyde et al. (2007) recall that market integration tends to influence stock returns 





Table 2 – Correlation coefficients. This table presents the correlation coefficients between the eight chosen European benchmark equity indices, for the full sample period 
ranging from January 2, 2012 to October 31, 2016. The eight country benchmark equity indices are the following: DAX30 is the German index, CAC40 is the French index, 
MIB is the FTSE MIB Italy, AEX is the Dutch index, IBEX35 is the Spanish index, ATX is the Austrian index, BEL20 is the Belgium index and PSI20 is the Portuguese 
index. All results are followed by their statistical significance levels: 10%, 5% and 1%, represented by *, ** and *** respectively. 
  Panel A: Full Sample 
  Germany (DAX30) France (CAC40) Italy (MIB) Netherlands (AEX) Spain (IBEX35) Austria (ATX) Belgium (BEL20) Portugal (PSI20) 
Germany (DAX30) 1.00 0.93*** 0.82*** 0.91*** 0.79*** 0.78*** 0.89*** 0.70*** 
France (CAC40) 
 
1.00 0.87*** 0.93*** 0.86*** 0.80*** 0.92*** 0.74*** 
Italy (MIB) 
  
1.00 0.82*** 0.89*** 0.78*** 0.84*** 0.74*** 
Netherlands (AEX) 
   
1.00 0.80*** 0.78*** 0.91*** 0.72*** 
Spain (IBEX35) 
    
1.00 0.77*** 0.83*** 0.74*** 
Austria (ATX) 
     
1.00 0.80*** 0.69*** 
Belgium (BEL20) 
      
1.00 0.73*** 
Portugal (PSI20) 




5 Main Results 
In this section, we present all relevant results obtained by following the four different 
methodologies described in Section 3. In detail, we analyze the abnormal variations in equity 
returns caused by both European Quantitative Easing program announcement and launch. 
In the following subsections, the multivariate regressions coefficients for both full sample 
(from January 2, 2012 to October 31, 2016) and subsample periods (from January 2, 2014 to 
December 31, 2015) are reported based on each dummy or dummies: PSPPa – Quantitative 
Easing program announcement; PSPP1 – Quantitative Easing program launch; All dummies – 
Average; Time-varying dummies; Excluding the market portfolio. For consistence, each of 
the following subsections results presents the Breusch-Pagan test of independence (3), 
obtained by considering each residuals’ correlation matrix. 
5.1. PSPPa – Quantitative Easing program announcement 
Panel A of Table 3 presents the coefficients of the multivariate regression (1) for the full 
sample period from January 2, 2012 to October 31, 2016. The multivariate regression includes 
eight equations, one for each European benchmark equity index, and considers two 
independent variables: the EUROSTOXX, a proxy for the market portfolio, and the dummy 
PSPPa accounting for the program announcement. Although most of the obtained coefficients 
for the PSPPa dummy are positive, they lack statistical significance.  
On the other hand, the announcement impact on the ATX index seems to be negative, 
statistically significant at 10% level. Here, one might suggest that the Austrian investors may 
not adjust their portfolio allocations during the announcement period, hence not pushing 
equity prices up. Indeed, at the days that followed the announcement of the program, the 
Austrian index (ATX) register, one average, more negative returns in comparison with the 
remaining equity indices (See Table 10). 
Panel B of Table 3 presents the same coefficients of the multivariate regression (1) for the 
subsample period from January 2, 2014 to December 31, 2015. The coefficient results 
regarding PSPPa (announcement) are consistent with the full sample period results, however 
they lack statistical significance. 
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Lastly, for both Panel A and Panel B of Table 3, the Breusch-Pagan test of independence (3) 
presents a p-value equal to zero, indicating that the applied methodology is suitable and 
powerful in settling the heteroscedasticity statistical issue, emerged from event clustering. 
Table 3 – Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model considering both market portfolio and PSPPa dummy. 
This table presents the coefficient results from the multivariate equation (1), described in Section 3.1. Panel A 
presents the full sample results of the multivariate regression when considering the Quantitative Easing 
announcement (on January, 22 2015) as the dummy variable. The regression includes both the market portfolio 
and the dummy variable (PSPPa) as explanatory variables. In total, the model incorporates eight equations with 
different dependent variables (indices i) and the same independent variables (EUROSTOXX and PSPPa). The 
full sample period is from January, 2 2012 to October, 31 2016, which incorporates 1232 daily observations. 
Panel B presents the subsample results for the same multivariate regression. The subsample period is from 
January, 2 2014 to December, 31 2015. which incorporates 507 daily observations. The eight benchmark equity 
indices are the following: DAX30 is the German index, CAC40 is the French index, MIB is the FTSE MIB for 
Italy, AEX is the Dutch index, IBEX35 is the Spanish index, ATX is the Austrian index, BEL20 is the Belgium 
index and PSI20 is the Portuguese index. EUROSTOXX is used as a proxy for market portfolio. The table 
reports regression coefficients, t-statistics and the Breusch-Pagan test of independence, distributed as a 
2
. The 
statistical significance levels are 10%, 5% and 1%, represented by *, ** and *** respectively. 
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 
Panel B: Subsample 
 
EUROSTOXX 𝛽 PSPPa 𝛾0 Obs.  
EUROSTOXX 𝛽 PSPPa 𝛾0 Obs. 
Germany (DAX30) 0.996 0.001 1 232 
 






France (CAC40) 1.035 0.001 1 232 
 






Italy (MIB) 1.262 0.001 1 232 
 






Netherlands (AEX) 0.867 0.001 1 232 
 






Spain (IBEX35) 1.106 -0.003 1 232 
 






Austria (ATX) 0.873 -0.004 1 232 
 






Belgium (BEL20) 0.831 0.001 1 232 
 






Portugal (PSI20) 0.859 -0.001 1 232 
 






Breusch-Pagan test 2 (28) = 1553.42    p = 0.00 
 
2 (28) = 655.45    p = 0.00 
 
5.2. PSPP1 – Quantitative Easing program launch 
Table 4 shows the coefficient results for the multivariate regression (1) which considers two 
independent variables: the EUROSTOXX, a proxy for the market portfolio, and the dummy 
PSPP1 accounting for the program launch on March 9, 2015. Here, Panel A reports the results 
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regarding the full sample period from January 2, 2012 to October 31, 2016, while Panel B 
reports the results for the subsample period from January 2, 2014 to December 31, 2015. 
Table 4 – Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model considering both market portfolio and PSPP1 dummy. 
This table presents the coefficient results from the multivariate equation (1), described in Section 3.1. Panel A 
presents the full sample results of the multivariate regression when considering the Quantitative Easing launch 
(on March 9, 2015) as the dummy variable. The regression includes both the market portfolio and the dummy 
variable (PSPP1) as explanatory variables. In total, the model incorporates eight equations with different 
dependent variables (indices i) and the same independent variables (EUROSTOXX and PSPP1). The full sample 
period is from January 2, 2012 to October 31, 2016, which incorporates 1232 daily observations. Panel B 
presents the subsample results for the same multivariate regression. The subsample period is from January 2, 
2014 to December 31, 2015. which incorporates 507 daily observations. The eight benchmark equity indices are 
the following: DAX30 is the German index, CAC40 is the French index, MIB is the FTSE MIB for Italy, AEX is 
the Dutch index, IBEX35 is the Spanish index, ATX is the Austrian index, BEL20 is the Belgium index and 
PSI20 is the Portuguese index. EUROSTOXX is used as a proxy for market portfolio. The table reports 
regression coefficients, t-statistics and the Breusch-Pagan test of independence, distributed as a 
2
. The statistical 
significance levels are 10%, 5% and 1%, represented by *, ** and *** respectively. 
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 
Panel B: Subsample 
 
EUROSTOXX 𝛽 PSPP1 𝛾1 Obs.  
EUROSTOXX 𝛽 PSPP1 𝛾1 Obs. 
Germany (DAX30) 0.995 0.003 1 232 
 






France (CAC40) 1.036 -0.001 1 232 
 






Italy (MIB) 1.262 -0.001 1 232 
 






Netherlands (AEX) 0.868 0.000 1 232 
 






Spain (IBEX35) 1.106 -0.004 1 232 
 






Austria (ATX) 0.871 -0.002 1 232 
 






Belgium (BEL20) 0.832 -0.001 1 232 
 






Portugal (PSI20) 0.859 -0.001 1 232 
 






Breusch-Pagan test 2 (28) =  1551.07   p = 0.00 
 
2 (28) =  652.45   p = 0.00 
By assessing the results from Table 4, we verify a positive abnormal variation in the German 
index (DAX30) returns, statistically significant at 1% level. In fact, Germany is the Eurozone 
country that incorporates the highest amount of liquidity coming from the European 
Quantitative Easing program (See Table 9). Then, one might also suggest that the strong stock 
market activity in Germany and the high correlation between DAX30 and EUROSTOXX 
indices seem to be plausible explanations for positive abnormal reactions in the German 
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benchmark equity index. Moreover, this change is consistent with the portfolio rebalancing 
mechanism (Tobin, 1969) where investors rebalance their portfolio as an expectation of 
performing better in the stock market. 
The remaining benchmark equity indices show negative abnormal variations in their returns, 
statistically significant at 5% and 10% levels for Spain (IBEX35) and France (CAC40), 
respectively. When considering the subsample period, the statistical significance for the 
Spanish benchmark index (IBEX35) improves to 1% level. Here, these negative changes in 
returns may be contextualized by a non-change in investors’ portfolio structure due to a 
decrease in their risk tolerance levels. In detail, for Spain (IBEX35) the negative impact 
caused be the program launch seems to be a consequence of the unstable national political 
environment throughout the year of 2015. Further, this reason may be also applicable for 
France (CAC40) and the Netherlands (AEX), where the role of governments is crucial to 
drive the effectiveness of the unconventional monetary policy under the Zero Lower Bound 
(ZLB) environment. 
5.3. All dummies - Average 
In this subsection, we apply the multivariate regression (2) to access the average abnormal 
variations in equity returns caused by both program announcement and launch. As proposed 
by Binder (1985), we apply a single dummy ?̅? into the multivariate regression (2) that 
incorporates both announcement (PSPPa) and launch (PSPP1) at once, accessing the overall 
changes in equity markets. Table 5 shows the coefficient results from the eight European 
benchmark equity indices for both full sample and subsample periods.  
In Panel A of Table 5, the overall results show that the European Quantitative Easing program 
seems to cause, on average, negative abnormal changes in 6 out of 8 benchmark equity 
markets, only statistically significant for Spain (IBEX35) and Austria (ATX) at 1% and 10% 
levels, respectively. The result is consistent with the recent study conducted by Assefa et al. 
(2016). In line with the isolated analysis of the program launch (PSPP1), here Spain 
(IBEX35) exhibits a negative average reaction in its benchmark equity index. Perhaps, the 
unstable political environment and associated uncertainty may be two relevant explanatory 
factors for the loss of Quantitative Easing program effectiveness, meaning that investors 
might not be willing to either invest or rebalance their portfolios during periods of instability.  
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Furthermore, in Table 5 the German index (DAX30) has a statistically significant positive 
abnormal return, at 1% level, consistent with Andrade et al. (2016). Although this positive 
reaction does not describe a clear path among most of the European equity indices, whether 
the portfolio rebalancing mechanism holds, it may evidence that German investors chose new 
asset classes (such as stocks or benchmark indices) due to the large liquidity available in 
markets. 
Table 5 – Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model – Two-Step Estimator. This table presents the results from 
the multivariate regression (2). This regression includes a single dummy 𝐷𝑎,𝑡 = 1 for all days into the event 
windows, each time we consider a related-event of European Quantitative Easing, and zero otherwise. The 
coefficient ?̅? measures the average abnormal returns of each index i. In total, the model considers eight 
equations, different dependent variables (indices i) and the following independent variables: market portfolio 
(EUROSTOXX) and average dummy ?̅?. Panel A presents the results for the full sample from January 2, 2012 to 
October 31, 2016, that incorporates 1232 daily observations. Panel B presents the results for the same regression 
model, for a subsample from January 2, 2014 to December 31, 2015, that incorporates 507 daily observations. 
The eight country benchmark equity indices are the following: DAX30 is the German index, CAC40 is the 
French index, MIB is the FTSE MIB for Italy, AEX is the Dutch index, IBEX35 is the Spanish index, ATX is 
the Austrian index, BEL20 is the Belgium index and PSI20 is the Portuguese index. EUROSTOXX is used as a 
proxy for market portfolio. Both panels report regression coefficients as well as its t-statistics. The statistical 
significance levels are 10%, 5% and 1%, represented by *, ** and *** respectively. 
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 
Panel B: Subsample 
 
EUROSTOXX 𝛽 All Dummies ?̅? Obs. 
 
EUROSTOXX 𝛽 All Dummies ?̅? Obs. 
Germany (DAX30) 0.995 0.002 1 232 
 






France (CAC40) 1.036 0.000 1 232 
 






Italy (MIB) 1.262 0.000 1 232 
 






Netherlands (AEX) 0.868 0.000 1 232 
 






Spain (IBEX35) 1.107 -0.003 1 232 
 
0.995 -0.003 507 
 




Austria (ATX) 0.873 -0.003 1 232 
 
0.793 -0.002 507 
 




Belgium (BEL20) 0.832 0.000 1 232 
 






Portugal (PSI20) 0.859 -0.001 1 232 
 






Breusch-Pagan test 2 (28) = 1550.33    p = 0.00 
 
2 (28) = 652.40    p = 0.00 
In conclusion, this incongruity among results indicates a non-regular path for general 
Eurozone countries, based on the analysis of benchmark equity indices. For instance, the 
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country reactions to the program may be justified by certain country-specific features, such as 
political, economic and banking regulations. Moreover, since financial markets are influenced 
by forward expectations, investor’s liquidity preferences and their levels of risk tolerance 
(Tobin, 1958), one might expect an early integration of the program’s information by 
investors and financial agents (Bernanke and Kuttner, 2004). Therefore, we assert that 
investors from countries in the Eurozone react differently to monetary policy shocks and, by 
this study, it is not possible to access the investment magnitude in equity markets as well as 
which potential changes occur in real portfolios’ composition.  
5.4. Time-varying dummies 
In this subsection, we present the results regarding the day-by-day analysis of equity abnormal 
returns for the European benchmark equity indices. Following the modified methodology 
applied by Rivolta (2014), we use 10 time-varying dummies into the multivariate regression 
(1) to access the abnormal changes in returns that may occur in each day of the chosen event 
window. For those dummies, the T-5 dummy is excluded to avoid potential collinearity 
problems. For each Quantitative Easing event (program announcement or launch), we jointly 
estimate the coefficients following the SURM, correcting for the potential presence of 
correlation between the countries’ residuals.  
Table 6 shows the multivariate regression results from the modified model for the 
Quantitative Easing announcement, its levels of statistical significance as well as the Breusch-
Pagan test of independence. For each day from January 15, 2015 to January 29, 2015 the 
model incorporates a dummy 𝐷𝑎,𝑡 = 1, excluding the day T-5, and zero otherwise. Overall, 
among all European benchmark equity indices, the path of the abnormal returns varies from 
index to index. For instance, there seems to be a negative reaction caused by the program 
announcement in the day T+1 for Italy (MIB), Spain (IBEX35) and Austria (ATX). For the 
German index (DAX30), it seems that a negative change occurs from T-2 to T0, indicating an 
anticipation from investors regarding the program announcement, yet not statistically 
significant. Contrary to portfolio rebalancing channel, perhaps investors kept on allocating 
the portfolio wealth in bonds or holding cash, yet not changing to riskier asset classes. 
However, this path changes after T0 until T+4 where positive abnormal change presents 
statistical significance, at 1% level. Also, for France (CAC40), it seems that T-3 and T-2 days 
are relevant in terms of abnormal variations in returns, however they are opposite in sign.  
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Table 6 – Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model – Two-Step Estimator by using Time-Varying Dummies for PSPPa event period. This table presents the coefficients 
results from (1) obtained by following the modified methodology described in Section 3.1. Panel A presents the coefficients of a multivariate regression that includes 10 time-
varying dummies and a proxy for market portfolio, for the full sample from January 2, 2012 to October 31, 2016, that incorporates 1232 daily observations. The time-varying 
dummies are considered from T-4 day to T+5 day. In detail, T-4 corresponds to January 15, 2015 and T+5 day is January 29, 2015. The eight multivariate regressions are 
jointly estimated. The eight country benchmark equity indices are the following: DAX30 is the German index, CAC40 is the French index, MIB is the FTSE MIB for Italy, 
AEX is the Dutch index, IBEX35 is the Spanish index, ATX is the Austrian index, BEL20 is the Belgium index and PSI20 is the P ortuguese index. EUROSTOXX is used as 
a proxy for market portfolio. The panel reports regression coefficients, its t-statistics as well as the Breusch-Pagan test of independence, distributed as a 
2
. The statistical 
significance levels are 10%, 5% and 1%, represented by *, ** and *** respectively. 
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 
EUROSTOXX 𝛽 T-4 T-3 T-2 T-1 T0 T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 Obs. 
Germany (DAX30) 0.996 0.001 0.000 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 0.004 0.004 -0.004 0.010 -0.001 1 232 
 
(122.75)*** (0.38) (-0.10) (-1.48) (-0.93) (-0.70) (1.15) (1.21) (-1.22) (2.96)*** (-0.18)  
France (CAC40) 1.036 0.000 -0.004 0.005 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.001 1 232 
 
(185.53)*** (0.16) (-1.94)* (2.14)** (0.52) (-0.47) (0.87) (-1.23) (0.56) (-0.28) (0.52)  
Italy (MIB) 1.263 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.007 0.004 -0.018 -0.001 0.010 -0.005 0.002 1 232 
 
(76.64)*** (0.91) (0.29) (0.15) (1.05) (0.66) (-2.72)*** (-0.14) (1.41) (-0.80) (0.24)  
Netherlands (AEX) 0.867 0.007 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 1 232 
 
(104.44)*** (2.14)** (-0.37) (0.12) (0.28) (0.45) (0.21) (0.43) (0.00) (-0.85) (-0.69)  
Spain (IBEX35) 1.107 -0.008 0.003 0.005 -0.003 0.000 -0.012 0.000 0.004 -0.011 0.001 1 232 
 
(69.72)*** (-1.20) (0.50) (0.81) (-0.46) (-0.06) (-1.77)* (-0.02) (0.60) (-1.70)* (0.21)  
Austria (ATX) 0.872 -0.010 -0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 -0.016 0.002 -0.002 -0.012 -0.006 1 232 
 
(53.10)*** (-1.41) (-0.66) (0.69) (0.54) (0.55) (-2.29)** (0.35) (-0.35) (-1.70)* (-0.88)  
Belgium (BEL20) 0.832 0.005 0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 0.000 0.005 0.004 0.005 -0.001 1 232 
 
(97.46)*** (1.34) (0.50) (-0.92) (-0.13) (-0.79) (-0.02) (1.32) (1.26) (1.35) (-0.17)  
Portugal (PSI20) 0.857 0.002 0.002 -0.007 0.013 0.010 -0.009 0.003 -0.005 -0.013 0.003 1 232 
 
(41.80)*** (0.24) (0.19) (-0.83) (1.57) (1.19) (-1.06) (0.32) (-0.65) (-1.57) (0.32)  
Breusch-Pagan test 2 (28) = 1547.14       p = 0.00 
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Table 7 shows the results from the multivariate regression that includes 10 time-varying 
dummies. Here, T0 is the day of the Quantitative Easing launch (PSPP1). The overall results 
lack statistical significance although there are unexpected results for certain indices. For the 
Austrian index (ATX), we find opposite signs in the reactions around the launch day, 
statistically significant at 5% level. Before the launch, the index reacts positively to the event 
while it reverses at the day T+1.  
Additionally, the Portuguese index (PSI20) registers negative abnormal returns at the days T-
3 and T+1, statistically significant at 1% and 5% levels respectively. Since the exposure of the 
Portuguese index (PSI20) to the European equity markets as well as to monetary policies in 
the European Union may be limited in comparison with higher traded indices in Europe such 
as DAX30 (Germany), one might suggest company-specific factors, other than the 
Quantitative Easing program itself, for the obtained negative abnormal variations in PSI20 
index returns. 
Overall, the results indicate a loss of power associated with subsequent events after the 
announcement of the Quantitative Easing program. According to Schweitzer (1989), the 
influence of subsequent events may persist even though the direction of returns (either 
positive or negative) lacks consistency. 
5.5. Excluding the market portfolio 
In this last subsection, we present the coefficient results for the multivariate regression (1), 
when excluding the market portfolio (EUROSTOXX) as an explanatory variable (𝑅𝑚,𝑡).  
Here, we intend to isolate the effect of the program and understand which variations are 
verified based on a single explanatory variable: The Quantitative Easing dummy (either 
PSPPa or PSPP1). We also do the process for the average multivariate regression approach 
(2). The chosen sample is the full sample from January 2, 2012 to October 31, 2016. 
According to Panel A of Table 8 we find a clear positive reaction from the European equity 
markets to the Quantitative Easing announcement (PSPPa). For 5 out of 8 European 
benchmark equity indices, the abnormal results are statistically significant at 5% level. This 
abnormal change is supported and may be verified by the portfolio rebalancing channel 
where investors seem to be willing to shift their short-term asset allocations into riskier assets 
(as it may be the case of stocks or benchmark equity indices). 
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Table 7 - Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model – Two-Step Estimator by using Time-Varying Dummies for PSPP1 event period. This table presents the coefficients 
results from (1) obtained by following the modified methodology described in Section 3.1. Panel A presents the coefficients of a multivariate regression that includes 10 time-
varying dummies and a proxy for market portfolio, for the full sample from January, 2 2012 to October, 31 2016, that incorporates 1232 daily observations. The time-varying 
dummies are considered from T-4 day to T+5 day. In detail, T-4 corresponds to March, 2 2015 and T+5 day is March, 16 2015. The eight multivariate regressions are jointly 
estimated. The eight country benchmark equity indices are the following: DAX30 is the German index, CAC40 is the French index, MIB is the FTSE MIB for Italy, AEX is 
the Dutch index, IBEX35 is the Spanish index, ATX is the Austrian index, BEL20 is the Belgium index and PSI20 is the Portuguese index. EUROSTOXX is used as a proxy 
for market portfolio. The panel reports regression coefficients, its t-statistics as well as the Breusch-Pagan test of independence, distributed as a 
2
. The statistical significance 
levels are 10%, 5% and 1%, represented by *, ** and *** respectively. 
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 
EUROSTOXX 𝛽 T-4 T-3 T-2 T-1 T0 T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 Obs. 
Germany (DAX30) 0.995 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.010 1 232 
 
(122.58)*** (-0.08) (0.64) (-0.13) (0.70) (1.43) (0.74) (1.45) (-0.01) (1.29) (2.90)*** 
 
France (CAC40) 1.036 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 1 232 
 
(185.19)*** (0.79) (0.85) (-0.63) (-0.71) (-1.44) (-0.57) (0.51) (-0.67) (0.05) (-1.24) 
 
Italy (MIB) 1.264 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.008 0.002 -0.006 0.000 -0.010 -0.006 1 232 
 
(76.47)*** (0.03) (-0.46) (-0.16) (-0.09) (1.23) (0.35) (-0.82) (-0.06) (-1.43) (-0.92) 
 
Netherlands (AEX) 0.867 -0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.000 1 232 
 
(104.31)*** (-0.65) (0.20) (0.60) (0.09) (-0.45) (-0.64) (-0.15) (-0.04) (-0.61) (0.11) 
 
Spain (IBEX35) 1.107 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 -0.003 -0.013 0.000 -0.003 -0.007 1 232 
 
(69.73)*** (-0.35) (-0.78) (-0.76) (-0.74) (-0.17) (-0.49) (-1.97)** (-0.05) (-0.43) (-1.00) 
 
Austria (ATX) 0.872 0.008 -0.011 0.008 0.015 -0.002 -0.014 -0.009 0.001 0.000 -0.008 1 232 
 
(53.21)*** (1.20) (-1.63) (1.12) (2.21)** (-0.36) (-2.13)** (-1.27) (0.12) (0.05) (-1.24)   
Belgium (BEL20) 0.832 -0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 0.000 0.001 1 232 
 
(97.32)*** (-0.90) (0.89) (-0.23) (-0.32) (-0.95) (-1.13) (-1.21) (-0.15) (-0.10) (0.24) 
 
Portugal (PSI20) 0.858 0.006 -0.022 0.008 0.007 0.002 -0.016 0.003 0.009 0.000 -0.002 1 232 
 
(41.94)*** (0.74) (-2.62)*** (0.97) (0.86) (0.22) (-1.85)* (0.35) (1.03) (0.00) (-0.28) 
 
Breusch-Pagan test 2 (28) = 1550.66       p = 0.00 
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Table 8 – Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model without the market portfolio – Two-Step Estimator. 
This table presents the results of the multivariate regression (1), excluding the market portfolio EUROSTOXX as 
an explanatory variable for the eight European benchmark equity indices returns. Panel A presents the results for 
the full sample from January, 2 2012 to October, 31 2016, that incorporates 1232 daily observations. In total, the 
model considers 8 different equations, different dependent variables (indices i) and both PSPPa 𝛾1 
(announcement) and PSPP1 𝛾2 (launch). Panel B presents the results for the same sample, applying the same 
process described for Panel A. Here, there is a single independent variable: All Dummies ?̅?. The eight country 
benchmark equity indices are the following: DAX30 is the German index, CAC40 is the French index, MIB is 
the FTSE MIB for Italy, AEX is the Dutch index, IBEX35 is the Spanish index, ATX is the Austrian index, 
BEL20 is the Belgium index and PSI20 is the Portuguese index. Both panels report regression coefficients as 
well as its t-statistics. The statistical significance levels are 10%, 5% and 1%, represented by *, ** and *** 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Full Sample Panel B: Full Sample 
 
 
PSPPa 𝛾1 PSPP1 𝛾2  
All Dummies ?̅? 
 
Obs. 
















































































Breusch-Pagan test 2 (28) = 23055.40 2 (28) = 23056.53 p = 0.00 
In detail, for Germany (DAX30), France (CAC40) and Italy (MIB) we strongly point out the 
amount of cumulative monthly asset purchases as a plausible explanation for the positive 
abnormal returns around the announcement of the Quantitative Easing program (PSPPa). 
These three countries are highly exposed to the European monetary policies and may have 
strong equity market activity. These results are consistent with Andrade et al. (2016) who find 
higher stock prices in all European sectors after the policy announcement.  
Although the results regarding the PSPP1 dummy (accounting for the launch of the program) 
indicate positive abnormal variations in returns, they are not statistically significant. This may 
be justified by the power of the event (higher in announcements) and by the portfolio 
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allocation near the announcement, thus not leading to a re-allocation around the Quantitative 
Easing launch period. 
Panel B of Table 8 presents the results for the multivariate regression (2) with a single dummy 
variable ?̅?. This accounts for the average abnormal returns in benchmark equity indices when 
considering the dummy PSPPa (announcement) and PSPP1 (launch) into the regression, 
simultaneously. According to the panel, it seems that the program caused, on average, 
positive abnormal returns in the 8 European benchmark equity indices. The positive change is 
notorious for Germany (DAX30) and for the Netherlands (AEX), statistically significant at 
5% level, and for France (CAC40), Italy (MIB) and Belgium (BEL20), statistically significant 
at 10% level. 
Again, the Breusch-Pagan test of independence (3) with a p-value equal to zero shows the 
appropriateness of the applied methodology and the power in settling the heteroscedasticity 
statistical issue, emerged from event clustering. 
 
Overall, by analyzing the four applied methodologies, the results show that countries with 
higher exposure to the program (such as Germany (DAX30), France (CAC40) and Italy 
(MIB))
3
 seem to react positively to the program, by both considering the announcement and 
the launch of the program. Moreover, although we do not measure the real magnitude of 
investors’ allocations into equity assets, we may suggest the portfolio rebalancing mechanism 
to support the positive market reaction in equity markets. On the other hand, we may identify 
political and company-specific issues, as well as unstable economic country environments, as 
potential explanatory factors for certain negative abnormal variations in country returns (such 
as for Portugal (PSI20), Spain (IBEX35), France (CAC40) and Austria (ATX)).  
                                                 
3
 Mainly measured by the cumulative monthly net purchases of the European Quantitative Easing program. 
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6 Further Research 
While the effects of the Quantitative Easing program may seem to have both short-term and 
distinct impact on the economy, mainly due to the artificial creation of liquidity or notable 
through the portfolio rebalancing channel, a longer-term effect might emerge regarding asset 
allocation, readjustments in both risk and term premiums and, therefore, boosting the real 
effects for the economy. Although in the literature some authors point out the existence of 
portfolio rebalancing by investors in periods where Quantitative Easing program is either 
announced or launched, this mechanism may require longer periods of time to demonstrate 
consistence and a regular path from investors decisions.  
A fact is that the program is still active in European markets and the economic effects are far 
from being presented in such a short measure of time. Therefore, the aim of this section is to 
provide some perceptions and mention further research regarding a longer-term analysis of 
the European Quantitative Easing program, enhancing the consistence of the results obtained 
in this study as well as the real effects observed in the economy. 
There are some interesting stances that may be discussed and analyzed. First, one may try to 
understand whether the European Quantitative Easing program has a long-term influence on 
relative supplies of both monetary and real assets, rather than on aggregate demand (Tobin, 
1969). Secondly, through a macroeconomic model of analysis, understand if the existent 
liquidity in the market (mainly held by national banks and other organizations involved in the 
program) causes positive effects in terms of demand for investment, consumption by 
individuals as well as by companies. Lastly, one may try to use the applied methodology in 
this study, with different event window and number of observations, in order to access 
comparable measures and improve the obtained results.  
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7 Conclusions 
This study analyzes whether the Quantitative Easing program has an impact on European 
equity markets. The existing literature regarding this unconventional monetary policy covers 
its impact on bonds and on interest rates, since they are the most affected asset instruments by 
long-term asset purchases programs. However, little research has been focused on the impact 
of the program on the European equity markets. According to Bernanke and Kuttner (2004), 
monetary policy surprises are only liable on a cramped parcel of overall stock prices 
fluctuation, that may not be a priori an outcome from monetary policy effects on target 
interest rates.  
Nevertheless, our study approaches the impact of the program on equity markets through 
benchmark indices. We consider the contributions of Binder (1985) and Pynnönen (2005) in 
the context of incorporation of dummy variables into the multivariate regression (MVRM). 
Due to potential issues regarding correlation between regression residuals and the presence of 
heteroscedasticity, a FGLS estimator is incorporated under the Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression Model (SURM). Then, we apply the methodology in four different forms with 
eight benchmark equity indices returns and dummy variables, depending on the event which 
is being analyzed. 
Regarding the announcement of the program (PSPPa), it seems that positive abnormal 
variations in returns emerge for equity indices as a consequence of investors’ decisions 
around the announcement day. When excluding the market portfolio as an explanatory 
variable, we find evidence of positive abnormal returns during the Quantitative Easing 
announcement period (PSPPa) in 5 out of 8 European benchmark equity indices. One might 
recall the portfolio rebalancing mechanism (See Section 2) as the first channel whereby the 
investors shift the allocation of their assets in the portfolio by taking riskier positions in the 
markets. The results are supported by Joyce et al. (2011) and Andrade et al. (2016). The 
negative abnormal changes in returns are consistent with Assefa et al. (2016) and may be 
explained by the differences in country environments (including both political and economic 
issues) as well as the potential lack of effectiveness associated with the Zero Lower Bound 
(ZLB) environment.  
Regarding the launch of the program (PSPP1), we find evidence of strong positive abnormal 
returns in DAX30 index (Germany) and negative abnormal returns in IBEX35 (Spain) and 
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CAC40 (France) indices. The first result may be associated with the exposure of the country 
to the large assets purchase program (See Table 9) while the second is associated with country 
politics (mainly Spain’s election in 2015). When excluding the market portfolio as an 
explanatory variable, the results lack statistical significance. 
Lastly, although the Quantitative Easing program is a crucial influencer for the European 
financial markets, its long-term effects are problematic to identify by merely looking at 
backward data with little number of observations. Nevertheless, for the short-term analysis 
and apart from other macroeconomic factors, the program influences benchmark equity 
markets in the selected period of the events and the reaction from equity indices may depend 
on the countries exposure to the program. 
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Appendix 
Table 9 – Cumulative Monthly Net Purchases, at October 31, 2016. This table presents the cumulative 
monthly net purchases by European Central Bank as at October 31, 2016, for all involved European countries in 
PSPP program. The cumulative monthly net purchases are presented in euro million. The securities covered by 
the PSPP are the following: 1) nominal and inflation-linked central government bonds and 2) bonds issued by 
recognized agencies, regional and local governments, international organizations and multilateral development 
banks located in the euro area (See ECB website). 
 
as at October 31, 2016 
EU Country 
Cumulative monthly net 
purchases* 
Total 1 147 655 € 
Germany 273 087 € 
France 216 699 € 
Italy 188 482 € 
Spain 135 215 € 
Supranationals 128 646 € 
The Netherlands 60 953 € 
Belgium 37 598 € 
Austria 29 823 € 
Portugal 22 862 € 
Finland 19 148 € 
Ireland 16 935 € 
Slovakia 7 709 € 
Slovenia 4 551 € 
Lithuania 2 088 € 
Luxembourg 1 634 € 
Latvia 1 259 € 
Malta 653 € 
Cyprus 248 € 
Estonia 65 € 




Table 10 – Daily log returns of eight European benchmark equity indices around the Quantitative Easing 
analyzed event. This table presents the daily log returns of eight European benchmark equity indices plus a 
proxy for market portfolio, around the Quantitative Easing event: program announcement on January 22, 2015 
and program launch on March 9, 2015. The eight country benchmark equity indices are the following: DAX30 is 
the German index, CAC40 is the French index, MIB is the FTSE MIB for Italy, AEX is the Dutch index, 
IBEX35 is the Spanish index, ATX is the Austrian index, BEL20 is the Belgium index and PSI20 is the 
Portuguese index. EUROSTOXX is used as a proxy for market portfolio. The shown dates represent the (-5,5) 
event window that is used in the methodology described in Section 3.1.  
Date DAX30 CAC40 MIB AEX IBEX35 ATX BEL20 PSI20 EUROSTOXX 
 
QE program announcement: January 22, 2015 
15/01/15 2.17 2.34 2.33 1.66 1.38 0.89 1.36 1.30 1.92 
16/01/15 1.34 1.30 2.15 1.78 0.56 0.11 1.48 1.24 1.22 
19/01/15 0.73 0.35 1.17 0.54 1.17 0.22 0.81 0.82 0.77 
20/01/15 0.14 1.16 0.91 0.60 1.24 1.02 0.21 -0.15 0.64 
21/01/15 0.41 0.87 1.63 0.72 0.50 0.99 0.55 1.94 0.72 
22/01/15 1.32 1.50 2.41 1.50 1.68 1.73 1.02 2.34 1.56 
23/01/15 2.03 1.91 0.24 1.51 0.67 -0.11 1.37 0.52 1.65 
26/01/15 1.39 0.74 1.15 1.00 1.08 1.09 1.29 1.12 0.99 
27/01/15 -1.58 -1.10 -0.54 -1.02 -0.91 -1.27 -0.54 -1.56 -1.18 
28/01/15 0.77 -0.29 -0.81 -0.48 -1.35 -1.34 0.29 -1.51 -0.22 
29/01/15 0.25 0.44 0.56 0.04 0.48 -0.32 0.20 0.54 0.31 
 
QE program launch: March 9, 2015 
02/03/15 0.08 -0.69 -0.18 0.39 0.00 -0.59 -0.03 -0.75 -0.11 
03/03/15 -1.15 -0.98 -1.40 -1.20 -1.48 -0.17 -1.25 -0.35 -1.12 
04/03/15 0.97 0.98 0.65 0.73 0.33 -0.44 0.95 -1.55 0.76 
05/03/15 0.99 0.93 1.21 1.11 0.66 1.66 0.79 1.71 1.04 
06/03/15 0.41 0.02 0.16 0.18 -0.29 1.64 0.03 0.87 0.17 
09/03/15 0.27 -0.55 0.57 -0.33 -0.34 -0.42 -0.51 0.01 -0.21 
10/03/15 -0.71 -1.13 -0.97 -1.05 -1.38 -2.27 -1.20 -2.38 -0.96 
11/03/15 2.62 2.34 2.16 1.81 1.09 1.02 1.36 2.14 2.15 
12/03/15 -0.06 -0.21 -0.11 -0.06 -0.09 0.03 -0.10 0.82 -0.05 
13/03/15 0.86 0.46 -0.42 0.17 0.20 0.41 0.33 0.38 0.44 
16/03/15 2.21 1.01 0.95 1.12 0.73 0.25 1.12 0.83 1.25 
 
 
 
